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Since its inception, ALife has moved from producing large
numbers of highly-idealised, theoretical models towards
greater integration with empirically collected data. In con-
trast, demography — the interdisciplinary study of human
populations — has been largely following the principles of
logical empiricism, with models driven mainly by data, and
insufficient attention being paid to theoretical investigation.
Such an approach reduces the ability to produce micro-level
explanations of population processes, which would be coher-
ent with the phenomena observed at the macro level, without
having to rely on ever-increasing data demands of complex
demographic models. In this paper we argue that by bring-
ing ALife-inspired, agent-based methods into demographic
research, we can both develop a greater understanding of the
processes underlying demographic change, and avoid a limit-
ing over-dependence on potentially immense sets of data.
– But you are paying a lot of money for the dragon!
– And what, should we just give it to the citizens in-
stead? [...] I see you know nothing about the principles
of economics! Export credit warms up the economy and
increases the global turnover.
– But it also increases the dragon as such – I
stopped him. – The more intensely you feed him, the
bigger he gets; and the bigger he gets, the higher his
appetite. What kind of a calculation is it? He will fi-
nally devour you all!
Stanisław Lem, Poz˙ytek ze smoka [The Use of a
Dragon] (1983/2008: 186)
Introduction
After attending the very first Artificial Life conference in
1987, the evolutionary biologist John Maynard Smith fa-
mously quipped that ALife appeared to be “fact-free sci-
ence”. His comment was made in response to early ALife
work (see, e.g., Langton, 1989) that tended to be abstract and
conceptual, not to mention ontologically ambitious, making
no connection to empirical data in the conventional sense.
Over time, the early enthusiasm for highly abstract mod-
els in ALife has lessened somewhat, as it has become in-
creasingly clear that making such models empirically rele-
vant involves a highly contentious theoretical commitment
to artificial life as an instantiation of biological life (Silver-
man and Bullock, 2004). Instead, abstract and conceptual
ALife models have come to be viewed as tools for theoreti-
cal enquiry (Di Paolo et al., 2000), i.e., ways of explaining
the qualitative dynamics of complex systems. At the same
time, some modellers under the ALife banner have moved
toward a greater connection with empirical data (e.g., To-
quenaga et al., 1995; Smith V., 2008). ALife has expe-
rienced greater scientific respectability, we maintain, due
to the collective recognition that modelling and simulation
stand alongside theory generation and data collection in the
scientific cycle — or, as Rossiter et al. (2010) put it, models
are “first class citizens of science”.
Thus, ALife has been in a somewhat unique position:
starting from methods almost completely disconnected from
empiricism, the field has gradually moved toward a greater
integration with empirical data, while retaining a focus on
using simulation as a tool for theoretical investigation. In
this paper we consider a discipline which appears to be
following the opposite trajectory. Demography — the in-
terdisciplinary study of the development of human popula-
tions — has long been a field devoted to predictive statistical
modelling based on vast storehouses of data, while theory-
building has mostly taken a back seat.
Demography’s intense devotion to data has served the
field well when making projections of future demographic
change in human populations. Nevertheless, traditional de-
mographic methods struggle to develop well-founded expla-
nations of these changes, going beyond simple generalisa-
tion of the observables (Burch, 2003). One of the motiva-
tions driving ALife’s shift toward greater connection to em-
pirical data has been the recognition that neither theory nor
data alone are enough to provide coherent explanations of
phenomena. ALife has addressed this dilemma by bring-
ing more data into a largely theory-focused modelling enter-
prise, and we propose that demography, in order to develop
beyond its current epistemological limits, must also make
a move towards the centre by incorporating conceptual and
theoretical investigation into its heavily data-focused frame-
work.
The scientific benefit to such an approach would be the
enrichment of the theoretical foundations of demography.
In this paper however we will also discuss another, perhaps
more pragmatic, advantage to ALife-inspired demographic
models: as a means for escaping some of the burdens of the
time-consuming and combinatorially expensive data collec-
tion required to continue in the traditional fashion.
We begin our discussion in the next section with a sum-
mary of demography’s struggles with its data-collection de-
mands. We then move on to suggesting some potential ap-
plications of agent-based models for demographic research,
describing the relevant strengths and weaknesses of the ap-
proach. Next, a detailed analysis of several demographic
simulation models allows us to develop a more nuanced un-
derstanding of how agent-based models may provide new
utility and insight. Finally, we offer our conclusions, and
suggest some directions for future work in this area.
Motivation: Meet The Beast
In the context of large, policy-focused projects in social sci-
ence, modelling and simulation in some form has become
ever more important as a means of providing useful infor-
mation to stakeholders. Models provide a means of pro-
ducing predictions or characterisations of complex systems
which can give the stakeholder what they need: a target
number, a summary of current numbers, or numbers to be
wary of. However, many such modelling projects can be-
come quite large and unwieldy. We often find that we require
extensive amounts of data in order to feed into a large-scale
model (hereafter, for illustrative purposes, referred to as ‘the
beast’), and the process of collecting that data is inevitably
expensive and time-consuming. Plus, as our models get in-
creasingly complex, the beast becomes ever hungrier.
Demography offers a unique predictive potential given
the information embodied in the age structure of popula-
tions. However, for reasons we will discuss later, these pre-
dictions still remain largely uncertain. In an effort to alle-
viate some of the epistemological limitations, recent work
in demography has attempted to bridge the gap between
micro- and macro-level analysis (Courgeau 2007 and the
MicMac project — see Willekens 2005 and Zinn et al.
2009). Advances in event-history analysis and microsimula-
tions linked with multilevel statistical analysis have been of-
fered as potential solutions to the micro-macro divide. How-
ever, such methods still have one major weakness: poten-
tially enormous requirements for data due to the ‘combinato-
rial explosion’ of the parameter space. So, even as extended
modelling frameworks, such as MicMac, try to bridge the
micro-macro gap by producing linked simulations at both
levels of analysis, we still find ourselves hamstrung by the
need for large amounts of data.
Thus, we see demography reaching for more sophisti-
cated modelling paradigms and for ways to produce more
micro-level explanations of factors that drive population
change. Unfortunately, current modelling methods require
us to continue ‘feeding the beast’: pumping models full
of ever-increasing amounts of data, each dataset requir-
ing vast amounts of resources (time and money) to collect.
This has further impacts on the overall modelling enter-
prise: turn-around time for producing models grows out of
control; stakeholders find themselves confronted with nigh-
incomprehensible models and endless reams of data; and the
primacy of post-hoc statistical analyses inevitably leads us
toward certain types of models which seem to fit the data
well.
In the other part of the methodological spectrum, the use
of agent-based models a` la ALife in recent years has become
increasingly popular in certain areas within the social sci-
ences. Starting from Schelling’s (1978) famous residential
segregation model, and moving on to Axelrod’s Complexity
of Cooperation (1984), Cederman’s (1997) work on inter-
national relations, and the current wide spectrum of agent-
based models in social science (cf. Epstein, 2008 or Gilbert
and Troitzsch, 2005), the prospect of using agents to exam-
ine properties of human societies which are difficult or im-
possible to measure empirically has become increasingly at-
tractive. Understandably, many social scientists are excited
by the possibility of examining fundamental properties of
social phenomena without being forced to devote excessive
resources to primary data collection.
To date, much of the work extolling the virtues of agent-
based models for the social sciences have focused on the
potential explanatory benefits (Epstein, 2008). After all, by
examining the processes occurring between agents, perhaps
we can gain a greater understanding of how macro-level so-
cietal effects happen (although even this is debatable; see
Sawyer 2005). However, we feel that another, perhaps more
immediate benefit of agent-based modelling has been largely
ignored in the literature: the prospect of escaping the expen-
sive, time-consuming process of continual data collection.
Thus, in this paper we propose that agent-based mod-
els, informed by work in artificial life and social simula-
tion, can provide a way forward for demographers who seek
to escape the ‘hungry beast’ of highly data-driven research.
This approach allows us to create models which develop a
new understanding of population change without undue de-
pendence on excessive empirical data, and create an envi-
ronment in which models can be continually tweaked and
worked on as new information comes to light, rather than
simply sitting in stasis until the next wave of surveys comes
back.
In the next section we will briefly outline the current state-
of-the-art in demography, with focus on the contemporary
limits of demographic knowledge.
Where the Beast Lies: Demographic
Knowledge and its Limits
Demography is currently facing major epistemological chal-
lenges. In particular, demographers’ knowledge seems to
have reached its limits with respect to the predictability of
future population developments, as well as the ability to
combine micro- and macro-level information and to find a
compromise between the complexity and simplicity of an-
alytical tools. This section discusses these issues in more
detail.
The first problem with the limits of demographic knowl-
edge is the issue of predictability. Amongst social science
disciplines, demography has a unique predictive potential.
Unlike in economics or sociology, very important informa-
tion on the future development of populations is already em-
bodied in their own age structures. The main mechanism
of demographic dynamics is known, too: human popula-
tions change through births, deaths and, if considered at
sub-global levels, migrations. However, when considered
on their own, these three components of population change
remain largely uncertain (Hajnal, 1955; Orrell, 2007). They
also differ with respect to their degree of predictability: mor-
tality is considered to be the best-predictable component;
migration — the worst; fertility being usually located in the
middle (National Research Council, 2000).
In the context of the uncertainty of forecasts, predictabil-
ity limits have been extensively discussed elsewhere (Key-
fitz 1981; Keilman’s contribution to Willekens 1990; de
Beer 2000; Bijak 2010), with two main methodological con-
clusions. Firstly, it is argued that demography should em-
brace uncertainty more closely (Alho and Spencer, 2005), in
particular by moving from traditional deterministic projec-
tions to probabilistic forecasts. Secondly, there is an agree-
ment that with longer horizons — beyond 10 to 20 years
— uncertainty anyway becomes too large to be usefully de-
scribed in probabilistic terms, and hence there is a need to
turn to scenario-based approaches (see also Orrell and Mc-
Sharry, 2009; Wright and Goodwin, 2009). An open ques-
tion is, which elements should be included in such scenarios
and how should they be constructed?
The second limitation of demographic knowledge stems
from the problem of aggregation. Populations are composed
of individuals and, as argued by Courgeau (2007), focus-
ing exclusively on macro or micro-level analysis can gen-
erate problems with either ecological or atomistic fallacy.
Whilst demography until the 1980s was almost entirely pre-
occupied with the macro level, and since then increasingly
more with the individual level (mainly in a form of the event-
history analysis allowing for microsimulations), attempts to
bridge both levels are much more recent (Willekens, 2005;
Courgeau, 2007; Zinn et al., 2009). The multi-level mod-
els are usually also multi-state, states being for example age
groups, educational classes, or states of health. In such
models, individuals move between the states according to
some transition probabilities, usually estimated on the basis
of large-scale representative surveys, population registers or
census data.
The main challenge with the multi-level approaches lies
with their potentially enormous data requirements owing to
the combinatorial explosion of the parameter space at differ-
ent levels. That is exactly where the beast lies: Burch (2003)
identified it to be the realm of logical empiricism, on which
demography was — and still is — over-reliant. This phi-
losophy focuses on observable phenomena and attempts to
create generalisations solely on an empirical basis. As a re-
sult, in contemporary research problems driven by real-life
questions concerning more complex phenomena, the beast
can quickly become insatiable.
The third epistemological dilemma of contemporary de-
mography stems directly from the previous two. At its core
there is a question, whether complex models are more use-
ful to aid prediction and decision making than their simpler
counterparts. In terms of predictive performance, there is
no evidence that complex models perform better (Ahlburg,
1995; Smith S.K., 1997). If that is the case, there might be
a temptation to follow the Occam’s razor principle (or the
KISS principle in complexity science), disregard the addi-
tional subtleties involved in the modelling process and opt
for simplicity instead (Bijak, 2010). However, such ap-
proaches may not increase our understanding of the under-
lying mechanisms, and are largely limited to shorter time
horizons of decision making. To move beyond that, a differ-
ent approach to modelling would be required.
From this perspective, the following section discusses the
applicability of agent-based models in demography, with fo-
cus on how they could address the three challenges men-
tioned above.
Agent-Based Demography: Avoiding the Beast
In their seminal book, Billari et al. (2003) present a com-
pelling argument for the use of agent-based models in de-
mography, or what they refer to as ‘agent-based computa-
tional demography’ (‘ABCD’). Their enthusiasm for this ap-
proach stems from the potential for agent-based models to
build theories regarding social processes that underlie demo-
graphic change. They describe a new ethos for simulation in
demography, in which “the simulation is used first of all to
develop and explore theories rather than to evaluate empiri-
cally the consequences of given rates/probabilities” (Billari
et al., 2003, p. 11).
The suitability of agent-based models for exploring theo-
ries is certainly attractive for social scientists, as such mod-
els are well-positioned to examine the link between individ-
ual behaviour and higher-level organisation (Silverman and
Bryden, 2007). In demography, agent-based models provide
a potential platform in which the dynamic relationship be-
tween the micro- and macro-levels of a simulated popula-
tion can be more fully represented. While in recent years
multi-level microsimulation models, such as the ones men-
tioned above, have become increasingly popular, these mod-
elling platforms still fail to capture the influence of micro-
level behaviour and agent heterogeneity on macro-level en-
tities, and indeed the feedback of those entities on agent be-
haviour. Nor do they capture social interactions, formation
of social networks, or other elements which may contribute
to the social processes underlying demographic change —
here, agent-based models are more suitable (Gilbert and
Troitzsch, 2005).
Beyond these theoretical benefits, we propose that in the
specific context of demography, agent-based modelling of-
fers a possible means to escape some limitations to knowl-
edge imposed by the currently dominant data-based method-
ological paradigm. The first limitation — the one of
predictability — points us toward the potential for using
agent-based models for generating scenarios, which would
produce useful insights about demographic change over a
longer time horizon. A great advantage of agent-based mod-
els lies in their suitability for exploring a set of scenarios
based upon varied parameter settings. Modellers can de-
velop such scenarios based on variations within a parameter
space, which allow them to examine how these parameters
affect agent behaviour (and, in appropriately designed mod-
els, how those behaviours affect macro-level entities). In the
development process, boundaries to the scenarios are lim-
ited only by the modellers’ imagination rather than by data
availability alone.
The second challenge for demographers — the aggrega-
tion problem — again points toward agent-based models as
a possible way forward. After all, some ambitious social
simulations not only include individual agents, but may also
include macro-level components and thus allow for feed-
backs between individuals, as well as between micro- and
macro-level (Billari et al., 2003; Murphy, 2003; Silverman
and Bryden, 2007). This would allow the modeller to neatly
side-step the problem of focusing exclusively on either the
micro- or macro-level. Of course, this second challenge also
allows the beast to begin rearing its ugly head. As men-
tioned in the previous section, the prevalence of the logical
empiricist approach in demography places a certain primacy
on deriving sensible results only from empirical observation
(Burch, 2003). This naturally leads demographers to seek
out ever larger and more comprehensive data sets, each more
expensive and time-consuming to collect than the last.
We then find ourselves sat facing the third challenge —
that of simplicity. The beast gets hungrier for more data,
and the sets of numbers which need crunching continue to
grow in response. Agent-based models, however, necessi-
tate a different approach: data is given less primacy than
parameters. Rather than extrapolating from a given dataset
about a population, social simulations will attempt to gen-
erate a society using the given parameters. The latter can
certainly be informed by real-world data whenever they are
available.
Thus, a type of modelling used quite often to repre-
sent complex systems might require less numerical data in-
put than traditional methods. In certain contexts, the so-
cial scientists may not find any data necessary at all — as
in Schelling (1978), which demonstrated a possible mech-
anism for residential segregation based on individual be-
haviour without requiring any data, and only using a sin-
gle parameter. As an additional benefit, agent-based mod-
els can more sensibly be informed by qualitative data than
traditional methods, given that such data often explicitly at-
tempts to “elicit agent models directly rather than inferring
them from behavior” (Chattoe, 2003, p. 52).
So, agent-based models can present demographers with
a way to avoid the beast and get away from ravenous tra-
ditional models which require regular feedings of painstak-
ingly collected data. However, using such models in demog-
raphy may require a certain shift in focus: agent-based mod-
els are better-suited for exploring theories and scenarios than
for making firm predictions (Epstein, 2008). Therefore, per-
haps we may take inspiration from John Hajnal — himself
one of the most prominent demographers of the 20th century
— and focus on building models which “involve less compu-
tation and more cognition than has generally been applied”
(1955, p. 321). As we shall see in the following section, at-
tempts to bolster the power of traditional data-driven models
have not always been successful — and agent-based models
have already been proven useful in some areas of demogra-
phy.
Analysis: Case Studies of Demographic
Models
In demography, there are notable examples of models that
fell short of their proclaimed aims due to the presence of
the data-hungry beast. With respect to approaches span-
ning the micro and macro levels, an interesting attempt to
apply methods from the system dynamics tradition to a de-
mographic problem — migration — was the one by Wei-
dlich and Haag (1988). However, solutions proposed by the
authors, based on systems of differential equations, despite
their mathematical sophistication and elegance, did not be-
come a part of demographers’ toolkit. There were several
reasons for this. Some reviews of Weidlich’s and Haag’s
book stressed that their method did not take into account het-
erogeneity of migration with respect to age, sex and past mi-
gration history1. Other points of criticism were that the ap-
proach did not model agents at all, thus not exploring the un-
derlying social complexity in full, and did not provide many
examples of empirical applications, mainly due to very large
data requirements2. Finally, the quasi-deterministic nature
1Daniel Courgeau’s review of Weidlich and Haag (1988). Pop-
ulation 46(5), 1991: 1298–1299.
2J. Barkley Rosser’s review of W. Weidlich’s (2002) book “So-
ciodynamics: A Systematic Approach to Mathematical Modelling
of the models made them overly reliant on analytical solu-
tions to the system of differential equations describing the
dynamics of the migration system in question.
More recently, the MicMac project, as previously men-
tioned, aimed to develop a new methodology for dynamic
microsimulation in demography (Willekens, 2005; Zinn et
al., 2009). The final MicMac model consists of a macro-
level part, which examines demographic change at the pop-
ulation level (known as Mac), together with a micro-level
model that examines demographic events at the micro level
(known as Mic). The model aims to bridge the micro-
macro gap, providing a comprehensive modelling package
which can pinpoint the influences of micro-level demo-
graphic events on macro-level demographic change (see also
Billari et al., 2006).
In practice, however, the beast once again rears its head,
and data requirements in this case are substantial. The mi-
crosimulation portion of the model (Mic) requires a signifi-
cant amount of detailed micro-level data to implement, espe-
cially on transition rates between all possible demographic
states for individuals3. The macro-level model (Mac) also
requires extensive data about transition rates in order to run.
Given that Mic includes 12 variables for each individual,
very large amounts of input data are required to produce age-
and time-specific transition rates between all possible states.
In turn, from the opposite — agent-based — end of the
modelling spectrum, one example of an agent-based model
producing some historical demographic insight is the model
of the Kayenta Anasazi civilisation (Axtell et al., 2002). The
model attempts to explain the rapid decline of the Kayenta
Anasazi tribe in Long House Valley in northeastern Ari-
zona, United States. The Anasazi tradition began in the area
around 1800 B.C., when maize was introduced as a major
agricultural crop. Around 1300 A.D., the population de-
clined rapidly, and eventually there was a mass exodus from
the valley.
The model of Axtell et al. (2002) consists of a digital
reconstruction of the Long House Valley landscape, con-
structed using existing knowledge of the environmental con-
ditions at that period in history. The agents themselves rep-
resent households, individual people being more difficult to
identify with any reliability using the existing archaeological
data. Each household has certain rules of behaviour which
specify how it will select its dwelling and planting locations
during each calendar year based on how successful it has
been at satisfying its nutritional needs.
The model seemed to produce a simulated population
which closely followed the ebbs and flows of the real
in the Social Sciences.” Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society,
3, 2005: 331–335.
3See Deliverable D9 of MicMac: “Report on Data Require-
ments of MIC” by F Willekens, J de Beer and N van der Gaag:
http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/Content/NIDI/output/micmac/micmac-
d9.pdf
Anasazi population in Long House Valley. Interestingly,
however, the model shows that some small sustainable popu-
lation could have remained in the northern part of the valley,
even as the environmental conditions started to degrade to-
ward 1300 A.D.; this contrasts with the real population, in
which the remaining people joined the mass exodus leaving
the valley.
This model thus demonstrates that the demographic
changes which affected the Anasazi population in this area
can be explained at least in part by an agent-based model
with simple behavioural rules. As the environment degrades
over time, and the agents must continue to look for fertile
ground in which to plant their fields, the simulated popula-
tion shifts northward, just as the real Anasazi had done. In
contrast, a demographic model which did not capture these
rules of individual behaviour may have been able to accu-
rately portray the changes occurring at an aggregate level,
but would not be able to explainwhy those changes occurred.
Of course one might ask, how did this model keep the
beast from getting out of control? The model clearly incor-
porated many pieces of information from a variety of disci-
plines. However, it is interesting to note in this case how
the beast was fed. The archaelogical data used here had
been previously gathered by another project for archaeolog-
ical purposes, and there is a distinct absence of resource-
consuming data-collection exercises directly linked to the
model. Interestingly from a demographic point of view, next
to available archaelogical information, the model was able
to incorporate qualitative data in the form of ethnographical
research: the agents’ behavioural rules were formulated by
distilling ethnographic knowledge about the Anasazi civili-
sation into simple rules driving their migration and agricul-
tural activities.
Another example of an agent-based model producing de-
mographic insight is a recent study of marriage offered by
Billari et al. (2007). Their model was constructed as an at-
tempt to bridge the gap between two different perspectives
which predominate in the study of the timing of marriage in
populations: macro-level statistical modelling used by de-
mographers, and micro-level studies performed by psychol-
ogists and economists examining the partner (mate) search
process. In this context, an agent-based model is seen as a
possible way to “account for macro-level marriage patterns
while starting from plausible micro-level assumptions” (Bil-
lari et al., 2007, p. 60).
The resulting model assumes that the formation of mar-
riage partnerships is the result of social interaction between
heterogeneous agents. The model attempts to demonstrate
the link between these interactions and marriage patterns by
simulating the impact of the availability of mates and the
desirability of marriage, which is affected by the influence
of relevant others in an agent’s social network. The results
show that the model can reproduce the hazard functions of
marriage observed at the population level in the real world.
The performed sensitivity analysis suggests that the results
are robust to changes in the relevant simulation parameters.
The findings of Billari et al. (2007) have important im-
plications for demographers wishing to avoid the beast. As
the authors note, the model uses substantial simplifying as-
sumptions: placing the agents in a one-dimensional, circu-
lar space; leaving out additional social complexities such as
courtship or divorce; and focusing only on age and location
as agent attributes, ignoring kinship, education, occupation,
socio-economic status, or other similar factors. In fact, the
simulation almost entirely ignores any empirical data, with
the exception of the initial population which is generated
with an age distribution reminiscent of 1950s America.
Despite the paucity of data, however, the simulation-
based demographic models seem to produce at least plausi-
ble micro-level explanations of macro-level phenomena. In
the work of Billari et al. (2007) this concerns the influence
of social pressure to get married within a social network, and
the variation of the size of that network by age is a determi-
nant of the desirability of marriage. In contrast, a macro-
level statistical model of marriage timing would not be able
to provide this sort of micro-level explanation — and would
require significantly larger investments into data collection
in order to function. In turn, the study of Axtell et al. (2002)
captured the main factors behind the expansion and twilight
of the Anasazi population. One could imagine painstaking
efforts to reconstruct birth, death and migration rates based
on fragmented pieces of historical information, but the ensu-
ing results of traditional demographic predictions would be
too uncertain to be meaningful. The beast might be fed and
sated — but our understanding of the underlying processes
would be no greater.
Conclusions
Our discussion and analysis have demonstrated that tra-
ditional demographic methods, while highly accomplished
in producing data-driven population projections, face some
major epistemological and pragmatic challenges. The over-
all focus on data over theoretical investigation has ham-
pered demography’s ability to provide explanations of de-
mographic change, while the hunger of the beast of logical
empiricism traps demographers in continuous cycles of ex-
pensive and time-consuming data-collection.
As we have seen, the application of agent-based methods
inspired by contemporary ALife work to demography pro-
vides a means to lessen some of these burdens on population
researchers. The resultant increased focus on explanation
over producing projections from empirical data could allow
demographers to develop more coherent micro-level expla-
nations of macro-level demographic change. More pragmat-
ically, the concomitant reduction in data dependence would
reduce the hunger of the beast, allowing demographers more
freedom to produce varied and ambitious models while also
removing the restrictive timetables imposed by lengthy and
expensive data-collection processes.
So far, all applications of agent-based models to popula-
tion change, such as the ones mentioned earlier in our anal-
ysis, have been performed separately, abstracting away from
the main mechanism and inertia of population dynamics.
The challenge ahead is to build models which would com-
bine various features of demographic processes and yield ar-
tificial populations equipped with real-world characteristics.
In that respect, agent-based demography is not only inter-
esting as a research field, but also as a promising venue for
answering questions relevant to policy makers. Moreover,
it provides the users of the final research output with more
possibilities for interacting with the researchers, by engag-
ing in the experimentation with the artificial worlds created.
For both parties involved in the process — researchers, as
well as the end-users of research — this can bring about a
better understanding of the underlying population processes,
which itself can be a very important gain from the whole
modelling exercise.
From these points of view, agent-based demography
seems to be an innovative way of moving the whole re-
search field in a new direction, towards the middle ground
on the theory-data spectrum. For the ALife community, this
‘dialectic’ position would open up a whole new, fascinat-
ing field of research with direct applications to real-world
problems. However, building agent-based models to popu-
lation questions would require that demographers use more
imagination than in pure data-driven modelling, in line with
Hajnal’s credo. Agent-based modelling can offer a solu-
tion, which has to be based on cognition and thinking about
mechanisms (Burch, 2003; Chattoe, 2003), while taking into
account these pieces of information (data) that are already
available. In that respect, the rule of the thumb for agent-
based demographers who would like to strike the delicate
balance between empiricism and explanation is: we should
feed the beast where feasible — but not more.
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